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 The Charter Balance against 
Unscrupulous Law and Order 
Politics 
Don Stuart 
I. UNSCRUPULOUS LAW AND ORDER POLITICS  
OF THE HARPER GOVERNMENT 
Politicians have always been seduced by the expediency of law and 
order politics. There are few votes in being soft on crime. Former Liberal 
Governments twice passed anti-gang legislation in a day without com-
mittee consultation on the eve of federal elections. But the level of 
discourse and dogged resolve by the Harper Government to use its 
majority to toughen the criminal law, whatever the consequences and 
ignoring the advice from numerous experts, has reached new lows. 
I first need to justify the deprecating use of the adjective “unscru-
pulous”. 
On January 29, 2010, five new Senators were appointed. A Department 
of Justice press release of that date has Minister of Justice Nicholson 
saying: 
The Prime Minister’s action has not only brought additional talent and 
expertise to the Senate; it has greatly strengthened our efforts to move 
forward on our tackling-crime agenda. The opposition has obstructed 
that agenda in the Senate, most notably by gutting Bill C-15 — a bill 
proposing mandatory jail time for serious drug offences, and a key part 
of the government’s efforts to fight organized crime.1 
                                                                                                             
 Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. Many of the views expressed in this 
paper first appeared in articles or annotations in the Criminal Reports, D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal 
Law: A Treatise, 6th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2011) or Charter Justice in 
Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2010). 
1 Department of Justice, News Release, “Ministers Welcome New Senators to Help Sup-
port Law-and-Order Bills” (January 29, 2010), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nr-
cp/2010/doc_32473.html>. 
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In the same press release, Minister Paradis says: “These five new 
Senators support all our measures. And today, we ask the opposition 
parties to listen to the victims of crime and to support our measures, 
too.”2 
On March 12, 2012, Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities 
Act,3 was finally rammed through Parliament, with the government 
imposing unseemly time limits on debate of the Bill both in Parliament 
and at the committee stage. The government had packaged together a 
variety of crime-fighting measures. This omnibus bill pushed through 
nine previous bills introduced when the Harper Government did not have 
a majority and which had been the subject of opposition amendments. By 
and large, Bill C-10 was presented and passed without those opposition 
amendments. The legislation inter alia: 
• introduces mandatory minimum imprisonment sentences for 
possession of illegal drugs for the purposes of trafficking and all sex 
offences against children; 
• stiffens sentences for violent youth crimes; 
• ends conditional sentences (allowing for house arrest) for a number 
of offences, including all sexual offenders; 
• eliminates pardons (now called record suspensions) for a number of 
offences; and 
• creates new civil remedies for victims of terrorism. 
The government consistently defended its action by saying it was 
listening to victims and police and had the support of the majority of 
Canadians. Interestingly, when the government recently abolished the 
long-gun registry,4 it went off message, ignoring and attacking the views 
of victims’ groups and police associations. Whatever its pragmatic pitch, 
the present government now never mentions the presumption of inno-
cence, the right to a fair trial and the need to use the blunt instrument of 
the criminal sanction with restraint. 
In the committee processes, such as they were, academic experts 
from Canada and abroad were mocked and ignored. Evidence from 
                                                                                                             
2 Id. 
3 Bill C-10, An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State 
Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Youth Criminal 
Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and other Acts, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2012 
(assented to March 13, 2012), S.C. 2012, c. 1 [hereinafter “Bill C-10”]. 
4 Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 
2012 (assented to April 5, 2012), S.C. 2012, c. 6 [hereinafter “Bill C-19”]. 
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criminologists that crime rates5 are declining and that there is no evi-
dence that stiffer sentences deter had no impact. In response to a 2009 
Statistics Canada report that 95 per cent of Canadians surveyed were 
satisfied with their personal safety from crime, Mr. Nicholson resorted to 
his now familiar and aloof mantra that “[w]e don’t govern on the basis of 
statistics.”6 
The government did not respond to the Canadian Bar Association’s 
100-page brief voicing concern about the rigidity and unfairness of 
mandatory minimums, the stress on incarceration, and the effect of these 
measures on disadvantaged groups, especially Aboriginal Canadians.7 
They also were not moved by the testimony of Howard Sapers, the 
Correctional Investigator, that: 
Some of the amendments will almost certainly have disproportionate 
impacts on Canada’s more marginalized populations, including 
aboriginal peoples, visible minorities, those struggling with addictions 
and substance abuse problems, and the mentally ill. Indeed, nearly all 
the growth in the correctional population over the past decade can be 
accounted for by these groups.8 
Also ignored was a coalition of U.S. law enforcement officials, 
judges and prosecutors which called on the Senate committee to recon-
sider the mandatory minimum sentences. They concluded that, “[w]e 
cannot understand why Canada’s federal government and some provin-
cial governments would embark down this road.”9 
Former senior officials have now spoken out in an extraordinary 
show of unison and bravado. David Daubney, a long-time senior De-
partment of Justice advisor, noted that: “[since] the mid-2000s, the 
Justice Department has asked for less and less research to be undertaken 
                                                                                                             
5 Statistics Canada figures for 2011 show that crime rates have reached their lowest level 
since 1973. 
6 Kim Mackrael, “Though Canadians feel safe, Conservatives move ahead on crime bill” 
The Globe and Mail (December 1, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
though-canadians-feel-safe-conservatives-move-ahead-on-crime-bill/article4246898/>. 
7 House of Commons Debates, Consideration of Senate Amendments, 089 (March 5, 2012), 
at 1029 (as summarized by Jack Harris, M.P. (N.D.P.)). 
8 House of Commons Debates, Consideration of Senate Amendments, 093 (March 9, 2012), 
at 1005 (quoted by Jack Harris, M.P. (N.D.P.)). 
9 House of Commons Debates, Consideration of Senate Amendments, 084 (February 27, 
2012) (quoted by Irwin Cotler, M.P.O. (Liberal)). 
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and typically ignores recommendations against policies such as manda-
tory minimum sentences or prison expansion.”10 
John Edwards, former commissioner of Correctional Services Can-
ada, Willlie Gibbs, former chair of the Parole Board of Canada and Ed 
McIsaac, former executive director of the office of the Correctional 
Investigator, issued a joint press statement11 against the Harper tough on 
crime agenda. They ask: “In a country that prides itself on fairness, 
compassion and pursuit of equality, why do we accept the idea that 
community safety will be enhanced through increased incarceration?”12 
Noting the existing reality of current double and treble bunking in federal 
and provincial jails, and the acceptance in the United Stated and the 
United Kingdom that minimum sentence regimes have been costly 
failures that have not made the public safer, they conclude that: “Crimi-
nal justice legislation that increases prison populations while draining 
resources from community programs in mental health, education, child 
poverty and social services makes absolutely no sense.”13 
In its resolve to pass Bill C-10, the government steadfastly refused 
opposition requests for cost estimates for the much greater resort to 
imprisonment. A 95-page study14 by the office of Ken Page, Parliament’s 
independent budgetary officer, estimated the cost of drastically restrict-
ing conditional sentences (just one aspect of the Bill C-10) at $137 
million per year for provincial governments and $8 million for the 
federal government. Both Ontario and Quebec have indicated they will 
not pay the costs of implementing Bill C-10. 
So, the record shows that the government arrogantly rejected the ad-
vice of a broad cross-section of experts and government officials and 
simply persistently relied on its self-styled lie that the Bill will make 
Canadians safer. 
Canada is now one of the few Western countries that does not have 
an independent Law Reform Commission or a Sentencing Commission 
to keep track of sentencing realities and options. I have long seen the 
need for legislation to simplify and make more principled our substan-
                                                                                                             
10 Kirk Makin, “Crime bill threatens to undo decades of reform, former MP warns” The 
Globe and Mail (February 14, 2012), online: <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/crime-
bill-threatens-to-undo-decades-of-reform-former-mp-warns/article545747/?service=mobile>. 
11 J. Edwards, W. Gibbs & E. McIsaac, “Jails don’t keep people out of jail” The Globe and 




14 Released on February 8, 2012. 
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tive, procedural and evidentiary laws. In the case of sentencing, princi-
ples were inserted into the Criminal Code in 1995,15 but since then 
governments, and especially now the Harper Government, have ignored 
them in the rush to impose minimum penalties. There are now 40. A 
conference at the Faculty of Law at Queen’s University in 199816 sought 
unsuccessfully to revive previous efforts towards principled simplifica-
tion by the Law Reform commission, a Canadian Bar Association Task 
Force and others. I have long favoured a General Part for substantive 
principles. 
However, having seen the government in action these last several 
years, I am now resistant to any such efforts unless there is a commit-
ment to delegate the task to a truly independent body where well-
respected judges, lawyers and academics are well represented. I am not 
optimistic. Emeritus Professor Marty Friedland17 has recently called for 
comprehensive legislation to simplify the laws of evidence, but he too 
wants the effort controlled by judges, not politicians. 
Pending that independent type of initiative, our entrenched Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,18 interpreted by an independent judici-
ary, offers the best hope for a better balance. Hopefully, this check will 
not itself gradually dissolve with increasingly more conservative ap-
pointments being made to the Supreme Court. Justice Michael Moldaver 
was recently chosen for elevation from a group of distinguished criminal 
experts on the Ontario Court of Appeal, likely because he had stepped 
out of his neutral judicial role to speak out strongly against what he 
called frivolous assertions of Charter rights for accused, noting that 
Charter issues were now mostly settled.19 
The Harper Government is no fan of the Charter, but has often rather 
piously pronounced its commitment to the rule of law in Canada and 
other countries such as Afghanistan and Libya. Our government should 
be proud of our judiciary and of our distinctive Charter. A good start 
would be a bill to remove sections of the Criminal Code that have long 
                                                                                                             
15 S.C. 1995, c. 22, s. 6. See especially Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 718-719. 
16 See D. Stuart, R.J. Delisle & A. Manson, Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1999). 
17 Martin L. Friedland, “Developing the Law of Evidence: A Proposal” (2011) 16 Can. 
Crim. L. Rev. 37. 
18 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
19 In my view, the problems he identified were seriously exaggerated and hardly spoken as 
a guardian of the constitution. See Don Stuart, “The Charter is a Vital Living Tree and Not a Weed 
to be Stunted — Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 280. 
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been declared unconstitutional. Parliament has not got round to deleting 
the unconstitutional objective “ought to have foreseen” element for 
murder under section 229(c) of the Criminal Code. On at least three 
occasions, which were embarrassing for the justice system, section 
229(c) in its unconstitutional form was left with juries. This necessitated 
new trials in British Columbia, Ontario and New Brunswick. In R. v. 
Townsend,20 Chiasson J., speaking for the British Columbia Court of 
Appeal said: 
I cannot leave these reasons without wondering why steps have not 
been taken to amend the Criminal Code to conform to the now 20-year-
old decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Martineau determining 
that language in s. 229(c) is unconstitutional. The law that is recorded 
in the statute, on which every citizen is entitled to rely, is not the law of 
the land. An issue such as arose in this case should not occur. It creates 
the risk of a miscarriage of justice and the potential need to incur 
significant costs addressing an error in an appellate court with the 
possible costs of a new trial, assuming one is practical. In my view, 
failure to deal appropriately with such matters by updating the Criminal 
Code to remove provisions that have been found to offend the 
Constitution is not in the interests of justice.21 
There are numerous provisions in the Criminal Code, such as abor-
tion provisions, some reverse onuses and parts of the defence of duress, 
which have been declared unconstitutional and should be deleted. 
Persons within and without Canada should be accurately informed by our 
Criminal Code as to our operating justice system. 
II. JUDICIARY ACHIEVES BETTER BALANCE THAN PARLIAMENT  
IN ASSERTING CHARTER STANDARDS 
1. Principles of Fundamental Justice 
In the last 30 years, the Supreme Court has used section 7 to estab-
lish a large number of Charter standards. Substantive standards now 
include: 
                                                                                                             
20 [2010] B.C.J. No. 1802, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 320 (B.C.C.A.). 
21 Id., at para. 43. 
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1. subjective mens rea for a few crimes such as murder, attempted 
murder and war crimes;22 
2. a marked departure standard for crimes based on objective fault;23 
3. due diligence with the onus reversed for regulatory offences which 
affect the liberty interest;24 
4. physical voluntariness for acts;25 
5. moral involuntariness for justifications and defences;26 
6. laws must not be too vague and must allow sufficient room for legal 
debate;27 
7. laws must not be overbroad in using means more than necessary to 
achieve their objectives;28 
8. laws must not be arbitrary;29 and 
9. laws must not be disproportionate.30 
Procedural standards established under section 7 include: 
1. pre-trial right to silence arising on detention;31 
2. principle against self-incrimination;32 
3. residual category of abuse of process;33 
4. right to full disclosure of Crown case;34 
5. right to have evidence preserved;35 
                                                                                                             
22 R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, 79 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.); R. v. Logan, [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 89, 79 C.R. (3d) 169 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26, 28 C.R. (4th) 265 
(S.C.C.). 
23 R. v. Beatty, [2008] S.C.J. No. 5, 54 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). The ruling on the facts was, 
however, remarkably generous to the accused. He veered into the wrong lane, killing three persons, 
and offered no real explanation other than that he might have nodded off after a day working in the 
sun. 
24 Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 48 
C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, 41 C.R. (4th) 201 (S.C.C.). 
25 R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, 33 C.R. (4th) 165 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J. 
No. 25, 41 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
26 R. v. Ruzic, ibid. 
27 Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 16 C.R. (6th) 203 (S.C.C.). 
28 R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, 34 C.R. (4th) 133 (S.C.C.); Canadian Foundation, 
ibid. 
29 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 86 
C.R. (6th) 223 (S.C.C.). 
30 Ibid. 
31 R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.). 
32 R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 29 C.R. (4th) 209 (S.C.C.). 
33 R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, 44 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
34 R. v. Stinchcombe, [1995] S.C.J. No. 21, 38 C.R. (4th) 42 (S.C.C.); R. v. McNeil, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 3, 62 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
35 R. v. La, Vu, [1997] S.C.J. No. 30, 8 C.R. (5th) 155 (S.C.C.). 
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6. right to effective assistance of counsel;36 and 
7. duty to give reasons to allow for appellate review.37 
This list of section 7 standards is strikingly long. Some accuse the 
unelected judiciary of having been too activist and having exceeded its 
original Charter mandate. In my judgment, this long list of standards has 
provided salutary checks and balances against the current lure and 
expediency of law and order measures. 
Canada should be particularly proud of its often quite distinctive and 
nuanced constitutional standards of fault. There is no evidence of 
rampant acquittals as a result. Fault standards are in place, however, to 
avoid injustice in borderline cases and to allow judges on occasion to use 
the criminal sanction with restraint. The policy foundation for these 
standards were laid by Dickson J. in the pre-Charter case of R. v. Sault 
Ste. Marie (City).38 Policy arguments in favour of some form of fault for 
even minor crimes39 outweighed those favouring administrative and 
enforcement expediency. 
Some see the ability of judges to strike down laws for arbitrariness, 
overbreadth, vagueness or gross disproportionality as alarming. The 
leading judgment is now the unanimous ruling of the full Supreme Court 
powerfully written and justified by McLachlin C.J.C. in PHS Community 
Services.40 The prohibition of drug possession under the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act41 was held to engage the rights to life and 
security of the person of the clients and staff of Insite, Vancouver’s 
supervised injection site. The Court held that the prohibition itself did not 
violate principles of fundamental justice as overbroad because the 
Minister’s power under section 56 to grant an exemption meant that it 
could be limited to appropriate circumstances. However, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that the Minister’s refusal to grant such an 
exemption to the Vancouver safe injection site was not in accordance 
                                                                                                             
36 R. v. B. (G.D.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 22, 32 C.R. (5th) 207 (S.C.C.). 
37 R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, 50 C.R. (5th) 68 (S.C.C.). 
38 [1978] S.C.J. No. 59, 3 C.R. (3d) 30 (S.C.C.), reasserted as a common law principle in 
Lévis (City) v. Tétreault, [2006] S.C.J. No. 12, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.). 
39 Chief Justice Dickson would likely have resisted recent proposals to make parking and 
potentially minor provincial offences subject to monetary penalties (Administrative Monetary 
Penalty System (AMPS)) determined by administrative officials rather than judges: Law Commis-
sion of Ontario, Modernization of the Provincial Offences Act: A New Framework and Other 
Reforms. Final Report (August 2011), online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/POA-Final-Report.pdf>. 
40 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 86 
C.R. (6th) 223 (S.C.C.). 
41 S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
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with principles of fundamental justice, as it was arbitrary and also 
grossly disproportionate in its effects. The remedy was to order the 
Minister to grant an exemption. Some media commentary has predicted 
that this ruling will lead to a more activist role for the courts in striking 
down legislation. One senior judge, who wished to remain anonymous, 
was quoted42 as saying that the Court had “opened a can of worms” and 
that many judges were “uncomfortable” in the role of assessing the 
effectiveness of governmental policy. It is true that the tests for finding 
breaches of fundamental justice under section 7 have been lowered and 
may seem unruly. The Court here identified three separate Charter 
challenges: arbitrariness, gross disproportionality and overbreadth. In R. 
v. Malmo-Levine,43 the majority had called for considerable deference to 
legislative choices and had asserted a test of gross disproportionality for 
challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth. Not so here. The separate 
head of gross disproportionality is also confusing. Apart from its impor-
tant role as a test for cruel and unusual punishment, the concept seems 
more appropriate as a consideration under a section 1 demonstrably 
justified reasonable limit analysis. However, a section 1 inquiry can only 
proceed where a Charter breach has been identified and established. 
It does, however, seem doubtful, given past judicial history in the 
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal, where such challenges have 
usually been quickly dismissed, that the judicial patterns will now 
radically change. The evidentiary record will rarely be as clear and 
uncontested as it was in the Insite case. It showed the effectiveness of 
Insite in reducing severe health and public safety risks in a particularly 
vulnerable population. Furthermore, Vancouver Health and police 
authorities, and the municipal and B.C. provincial governments, all read 
the evidence as favouring the maintenance of the Insite Clinic. It was 
only federal government law-and-order ideology that did not. 
As for procedural standards, the duty to disclose established in R. v. 
Stinchcombe44 is one of the best demonstrations of the power of an 
entrenched Charter to produce positive change. For years, prosecutors 
and Attorneys General had resisted disclosure rights and regimes, but we 
now know that full disclosure encourages guilty pleas and that non-
                                                                                                             
42 The Globe and Mail, October 11, 2011. 
43 [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 16 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80, 
16 C.R. (6th) 117 (S.C.C.). 
44 [1995] S.C.J. No. 21, 38 C.R. (4th) 42 (S.C.C.). 
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disclosure has been a major factor in wrongful conviction cases.45 There 
are strong arguments that disclosure requirements are costly and cumber-
some in mega-trials. However, these can often be avoided or lessened by 
sound prosecutorial discretion to sever trials into smaller groups, and by 
forceful management strategies by experienced trial judges. 
2. Power of Judicial Stay for Unreasonable Delay under Section 
11(b) 
One of the most important Charter checks is the enforcement of the 
section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time. After the decision 
in R. v. Askov46 on institutional delay, thousands of trials were stayed, 
particularly in Ontario. The Supreme Court got cold feet given the public 
outcry. In R. v. Morin,47 the Court adjusted the tests to include considera-
tion of: the factor of seriousness of the offence; no strict comparison of 
jurisdictions test; and putting the burden on the accused and deciding that 
prejudice to the accused was the controlling factor. Section 11(b) stays 
were quickly reduced to a trickle. 
In the last five years or so, stays have been on the rise again across 
the country with an Askov-like crunch looming in British Columbia48 and 
are already a reality in Montreal in a recent mega gang trial.49 The reality 
of lengthy unconstitutional delays due to lack of resources in the form of 
too few judges, too few Crown attorneys and insufficient legal aid, is a 
powerful indicator that law and order rhetoric to toughen criminal laws is 
easy and effective politics but seldom accompanied by allocation of 
sufficient resources to the judicial or prison systems. Without the 
infusion of adequate resources, victims will undoubtedly suffer in not 
having a chance to see justice done. Section 11(b) stays bring this 
hypocrisy to a head, and a delay crisis, as in the aftermath of Askov, will 
force governments to find new resources for the justice system. 
On June 4, 2009, the Supreme Court in R. v. Godin50 handed down a 
unanimous judgment upholding the trial judge’s stay of a sexual assault 
                                                                                                             
45 See, e.g., Nova Scotia, The Marshall Inquiry: Royal Commission on the Donald Mar-
shall, Jr., Prosecution, (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, vol. 1, 1989), at 238-42. 
46 [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, 79 C.R. (3d) 273 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”]. 
47 [1992] S.C.J. No. 25, 12 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morin”]. 
48 In R. v. Blattler, [2012] B.C.J. No. 300, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 290 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), Steinberg J. 
stayed an Internet luring charge for unreasonable delay and lamented the shortage of judges. 
49 Gangsterism charges were stayed against 31 of 155 alleged Hell’s Angels members in 
Auclair v. R., [2011] Q.J. No. 6103, 86 C.R. (6th) 155 (Que. S.C.). 
50 [2009] S.C.J. No. 26, 67 C.R. (6th) 95 (S.C.C.). 
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charge because of a 30-month delay between the date the accused was 
charged with sexual assault and the date set for trial. Writing for the 
Court of seven justices, Cromwell J. noted that this was a straightforward 
case, that virtually all the delays were attributable to the Crown and were 
unexplained, and that the length of delay risked prejudice to the right to 
make full answer and defence. This decision has the potential to further 
revitalize the section 11(b) right in several respects. The Court is far 
more accepting of the realities facing defence counsel seeking an early 
trial where court and Crown resources are lacking, placing a strong 
burden of justification of delay back on the Crown (in marked contrast to 
the approach in Morin) and not requiring evidence of actual prejudice 
(again in contrast to the ruling in Morin on the facts). The decision 
deserves to be carefully examined and applied.51 
3. Carefully Balanced Standards for Policing 
There is now a significant record of case law since the enactment of 
the Charter to suggest that our courts do a better job than Parliament in 
their non-political forum in balancing civil liberties of the accused 
against the need for effective police powers. The Hunter v. Southam 
Inc.52 presumption that warrantless searches are contrary to section 8, 
detailed Charter standards for strip searches53 and the new pronounce-
ment in R. v. Grant54 that detention or imprisonment that is unlawful is 
necessarily arbitrary and contrary to section 9, are each highly indicative 
of the power of the Charter to force change which limits the powers of 
the police. The case law is often complex and sometimes inconsistent. 
The other reality is that Criminal Code amendments have tended to be ad 
hoc and often too complex and unclear. 
In Hunter, Dickson, C.J.C. saw the judiciary as the guardians of the 
Constitution and that the Charter was in place to constrain rather than 
authorize governmental power. There is no doubt now that, in resorting 
to the ancillary powers doctrine over the years, the Supreme Court has 
actually authorized a number of new police powers. This occurred, for 
                                                                                                             
51 There are signs that Ontario Courts are not applying the rigour of Godin, as pointed out 
by Steve Coughlan in his forthcoming C.R. annotation to R. v. Lahiry, [2011] O.J. No. 5071, 2011 
ONSC 6780 (Ont. S.C.J.) (cited with approval in R. v. Tran, [2012] O.J. No. 83, 2012 ONCA 18 
(Ont. C.A.)). See also R. v. Khan, [2011] O.J. No. 937, 2011 ONCA 173 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 195 (S.C.C.). 
52 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter”]. 
53 R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.). 
54 [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 66 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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example, in the case of the limited power of investigative detention,55 the 
roadblock stop power,56 emergency entries57 and the use of sniffer dogs.58 
Some argue59 that the problem with the ancillary powers doctrine is 
that it is a fact-specific ex post facto inquiry which is vague and specula-
tive, and that it should be left to Parliament to allow for full democratic 
processes. Both citizens and police officers need to know which powers 
the state possesses in advance. But what of Parliament’s record of almost 
always favouring arguments of law and order expediency and listening 
only to police and prosecutor lobby groups? 
Consider the issue of police use of sniffer dogs. The Binnie test of 
individualized reasonable suspicion in R. v. Kang-Brown60 to limit the 
use of police sniffer dogs in routine criminal investigations is a well-
justified and pragmatically sound solution to making such a police power 
Charter compliant. Parliament has not bothered to attempt any regulation 
before (or since). Justice Binnie is also persuasive in holding that it 
seems far too late for four justices on the Court in that case to now reject 
the use of the ancillary powers doctrine. The horse is well out of the 
barn. The choice of a reasonable suspicion standard is indeed a reduction 
in the Hunter standard of reasonable and probable grounds. But the 
important and key aspect of the focus of all but one of the justices on an 
individualized standard is that police cannot just rely on police hunches 
and “Spidey sense”.61 These may mask arbitrariness and discriminatory 
behaviour, as long ago pointed out by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Simpson.62 
There are still concerns, expressed most forcefully in the writings of 
Professor David Tanovich,63 that our courts should do more to address 
the well-documented and corrosive aspect of racism in our justice 
system. 
                                                                                                             
55 R. v. Mann, [2004] S.C.J. No. 49, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 (S.C.C.). 
56 R. v. Clayton, [2007] S.C.J. No. 32, 47 C.R. (6th) 219 (S.C.C.). 
57 R. v. Godoy, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85, 21 C.R. (5th) 205 (S.C.C.). 
58 R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, 55 C.R. (6th) 240 (S.C.C.). 
59 See, for example, Steve Coughlan, Criminal Procedure, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2012), at 17-20 and James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers 
and the Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1. 
60 Supra, note 58. 
61 This explanation for a police stop was rejected by LaForme J. (as he then was) in R. v. 
Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 21 C.R. (6th) 65 (Ont. S.C.J.) as lacking an objective basis for 
reasonable suspicion. See similarly recently R. v. Brown, [2012] O.J. No. 1569, 289 O.A.C. 327 
(Ont. C.A.). 
62 [1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.). 
63 See, for example, D.M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (To-
ronto: Irwin Law, 2006). 
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4. Robust Discretionary Remedy of Exclusion of Evidence under 
Section 24(2) 
Of course, there are ongoing concerns as to whether the standards for 
policing are in fact being applied by police and implemented by courts, 
and that is why the Grant decision on section 24(2) is so important and 
encouraging. 
The approach to section 24(2) changed with the bellwether rulings of 
the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Grant,64 and R. v. Harrison.65 In 
Grant, a 6-1 majority rejected the Collins/Stillman conscripted/non-
conscripted dichotomy as too rigid for a discretionary power, hard to 
apply and yielding inconsistent results. It asserted a discretionary 
approach with revised criteria and emphasis. The Court arrived at a 
revised discretionary approach to section 24(2), free of rigid rules but 
placing special emphasis on the factor of seriousness of the breach rather 
than the seriousness of the offence or the reliability of the evidence. The 
same criteria are to be applied to all cases of Charter breach. Further-
more, the Court emphasized that where the trial judge has considered the 
proper factors, appellate courts should accord considerable deference to 
his or her ultimate determination. 
In a joint judgment McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. (Binnie, LeBel, 
Fish and Abella JJ. concurring) settled on the following revised template: 
When faced with an application for exclusion under s. 24(2), a court 
must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on 
society’s confidence in the justice system having regard to: 
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct 
(admission may send the message the justice system 
condones serious state misconduct), 
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected 
interests of the accused (admission may send the 
message that individual rights count for little), and 
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its 
merits. 
                                                                                                             
64 [2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 66 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]. The Court built on 
the earlier analysis of Arbour J. in R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 10 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.) 
respecting the exclusion of non-conscripted evidence. 
65 [2009] S.C.J. No. 34, 66 C.R. (6th) 105 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrison”]. 
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The court’s role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments 
under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering 
all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute.66 
According to the Chief Justice and Charron J., the words of section 24(2) 
capture its purpose: to maintain the good repute of the administration of 
justice. Viewed broadly, the term “administration of justice” embraces 
maintaining the rule of law and upholding Charter rights in the justice 
system as a whole. The phrase “bring the administration of justice into 
disrepute” must be understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the 
integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. The inquiry is 
objective. It asks whether a reasonable person, informed of all relevant 
circumstances and the values underlying the Charter, would conclude 
that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute. Deterring police misconduct is not the aim al-
though it could be a happy windfall.67 
In R. v. Côté,68 an 8-1 majority of the Supreme Court strongly reasserts 
the approach to section 24(2) it declared in Grant and Harrison. Faced 
with an exclusion decision for multiple Charter violations in an investi-
gation of a domestic murder case, the Quebec Court of Appeal arrived at 
a compromise along the lines of the now rejected Collins/Stillman 
dichotomy: the conscripted evidence of statements should be excluded, 
but the non-conscripted reliable evidence (here forensic evidence found 
in a warrantless search contrary to section 8) was to be admitted as the 
murder offence was serious. According to Cromwell J. for the Supreme 
Court majority, the Quebec Court of Appeal had first erred in intervening 
on the basis that the police had not deliberately acted in an abusive 
manner. The Court had exceeded its role by its recharacterization of the 
evidence, which departed from express findings by the trial judge of 
deliberate and systemic police misconduct not tainted by any clear and 
determinative error. The Court of Appeal had also erred in interfering 
with the trial judge’s section 24(2) determination by assigning greater 
importance to the seriousness of the offence. Justice Cromwell power-
fully reasserts that, once there has been a determination on the first and 
second Grant factors that the Charter violation or violations were 
                                                                                                             
66 Grant, supra, note 64, at para. 71. 
67 Id., at para. 73. Compare the pro-state view of the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court 
that the exclusionary remedy in that jurisdiction requires evidence that exclusion will deter this type 
of police conduct in the future (Herring v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. (U.S. 2009)). 
68 [2011] S.C.J. No. 46, 87 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Côté”]. 
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serious, the factors of the seriousness of the offence, the reliability of the 
evidence and the importance of the evidence to the Crown’s case, are not 
determinative and should not lead to admission. 
Most Canadian academics have welcomed the abandonment of the 
dichotomy between conscripted and non-conscripted evidence.69 The 
abandonment of the Collins/Stillman trial fairness yardstick has admit-
tedly set up an inconsistency with the separate discretion to exclude 
under section 11(d) to ensure a fair trial which the Court recognized in R. 
v. Harrer.70 This rarely exercised discretion is mostly applied in trials in 
Canada where the Charter breach occurred outside our borders. The 
Harrer jurisprudence needs to be reconsidered and made consistent with 
Grant. 
There can be no doubt now that Grant has put in place a robust dis-
cretionary exclusion remedy for section 24(2). Surveys now indicate that, 
across the country, trial judges are likely to exclude for Charter violations 
in roughly two out of every three cases for all types of Charter breaches 
and whatever the type of evidence.71 Appeal courts are less likely to 
exclude. Of course, the discrepancy between trial and appeal courts may 
be explained by the reality that courts of appeal are more likely to be 
confronted by selective Crown appeals against exclusion decisions by 
trial judges based on unreasonable errors. And Côté sends an unmistak-
able message that, absent errors, appeal courts should defer to rulings by 
trial judges. 
The importance of this reality should not be exaggerated. In the vast 
majority of criminal trials across the country, Charter issues are not even 
raised, and often, where they are, Charter violations are not found. But it 
is the reality that, in hundreds of rulings each year where Charter 
violations are found, the section 24(2) remedy of exclusion is now 
                                                                                                             
69 See D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Scarborough, ON: 
Thomson Carswell, 2010), at 595-97 and authors there cited. See also S. Penney, V. Rondinelli & J. 
Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011), at 557-73. 
David Paciocco, “Section 24(2): Lottery or Law — The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reason-
ing” (2011) 58 Crim. L.Q. 1 [hereinafter “Paciocco”] is, however, less enthusiastic about the new 
regime and expresses concerns inter alia about too much discretion for trial judges and the 
discounting of the factor of seriousness of the offence. 
70 [1995] S.C.J. No. 81, 42 C.R. (4th) 269 (S.C.C.). See further Paciocco, id., at 22-23, 
39-43 [hereinafter “Harrer”]. 
71 See Mike Madden, “Empirical Data on Section 24(2) under Grant” (2010) 78 C.R. (6th) 
278 (and see also “Marshalling the Data: An Empirical Analysis of Canada’s Section 24(2) Case 
Law in the Wake of R. v. Grant” (2011) 14 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 229). For a similar Quebec survey, 
see Thierry Nadon, “Le paragraphe 24(2) de la Charte au Québec depuis Grant : si la tendance se 
maintient!” (2011) 86 C.R. (6th) 33. 
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regularly invoked. The success rate is similar to that for applications for 
section 11(b) stays for breaches of the right to be tried within a reason-
able time. In section 24(2) cases, it is clear that trial judges are to be 
concerned not only about truth concerning guilt or innocence, but also 
about the truth that police officers are often proved to be deliberately 
flouting, careless or ignorant about Charter standards. If there is a 
concern about exclusion of highly probative evidence, the question 
should be directed against the apparently lax and ineffective training of 
police officers respecting Charter standards, even where they are clearly 
established. If the police learned to apply Charter standards, then there 
would be no possibility of exclusion. The police disregard for the Charter 
in Côté, a serious but routine domestic assault investigation, is shocking 
and an affront to the rule of law, as found by the trial judge, Cournoyer J. 
In Hudson v. U.S.,72 Scalia J., writing for a 5-4 majority, refused to 
apply the exclusionary rule to a violation of the Fourth Amendment 
“knock-and-announce” rule. He suggested that the exclusion remedy 
may no longer be necessary because of the increasing professionalism of 
police forces, with wide-ranging reforms in education, training and 
supervision, better internal discipline and various forms of citizen review. 
Policing and review standards have improved in Canada as well. 
However, those preferring alternative remedies, such as civil suits and 
police complaints procedures, now bear a heavy burden of demonstrating 
their comparative efficacy. In Canada, they have thus far generally 
proved to be a poor and low-visibility response to systemic problems of 
police abuse or ignorance of their powers under an entrenched Charter. 
Police are rarely, if ever, disciplined for Charter breaches. Civil litigation 
is expensive, uncertain in outcome and, if successful, likely to be subject 
to confidentiality agreements. Civil litigation is also highly unlikely 
where the plaintiff is in prison. In Vancouver (City) v. Ward73 the Su-
preme Court recently recognized a new right to sue civilly for compensa-
tion for a Charter breach but pragmatically restricted the remedy to 
superior courts.74 
Thankfully, our Supreme Court in Grant and Harrison saw the need 
for a vigorous remedy of exclusion for serious Charter breaches, how-
ever serious the crime. In this area as in others, our Supreme Court, 
                                                                                                             
72 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
73 [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 76 C.R. (6th) 207 (S.C.C.). 
74 The justifications the Court gave for this new civil remedy such as the need for deter-
rence and stress on a functional approach are inconsistent with the rationales the Court relied on for 
s. 24(2) exclusion in Grant. See, further, David Paciocco, supra, note 69, at 20-27. 
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mindful of its role as guardian of our Constitution, has given our criminal 
justice system a welcome balance against law and order expediency. In 
considering exclusion remedies, courts must be especially concerned 
with the long-term integrity of the justice system if Charter standards for 
the accused are ignored and/or operate unequally against vulnerable 
groups, such as persons of colour and those who are young.75 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CHARTER STANDARDS 
Chief Justice Dickson, in a visit to the Faculty of Law at Queen’s 
University, once suggested that academics are most impressive in 
criticizing but less so in offering constructive changes. In that spirit, I 
offer five suggestions for change to better respect the rights of the 
accused. 
1. The Test for Exclusion under Section 24(2) Should Be Clarified 
Respecting the Issues of Discoverability and Good Faith 
Justice Cromwell in Côté holds that discoverability is a factor rele-
vant to the first two Grant factors but not determinative. In that case, the 
fact that the police could have acted in compliance with the Charter made 
the violation and invasion of privacy more serious. Justice Cromwell 
repeats a line in Grant that trial judges should not speculate about 
discoverability. Whether the police would have discovered the evidence 
is necessarily speculative. Surely it would be better for the Court to 
abandon this unprincipled and confusing inquiry? The focus should be on 
what the police did, not on what they might have done. Discoverability 
should always, as in Côté, amount to a “catch 22” for the Crown: if the 
police did not have to break the Charter standard, their breach is more 
serious. 
There is also room for greater clarity on the issue of police “good 
faith”. According to the Court in Grant, “good faith” on the part of the 
police will mitigate the seriousness of the violation, but “ignorance of 
Charter standards must not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or 
wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith”.76 It would also have 
                                                                                                             
75 In developing standards for strip searches, the majority of the Court in R. v. Golden, 
[2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, at para. 83 (S.C.C.), took into account Commission 
findings of overrepresentation of African Canadians and Aboriginals in the Canadian criminal justice 
system and likely disproportionality in arrests and searches. 
76 Grant, supra, note 64, at para. 75. 
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been preferable had the Court in Grant expressly disavowed the utility of 
the politically and emotionally charged labels of good or bad faith, which 
have produced uncertainty and inconsistency.77 Judges are very familiar 
with deciding whether conduct was intentional or negligent. A Charter 
breach should be considered especially serious where the police have 
intentionally breached a Charter standard and serious where the breach 
was negligent. Police misperception or ignorance of Charter standards 
should only mitigate a Charter breach where the Crown has shown due 
diligence by the police in their attempt to comply with Charter standards. 
2. There Should Be a Better Balance of the Rights of Accused and 
Complainants in Sexual Assault Cases 
Although there are now calls to recognize new legal and constitu-
tional rights for victims and complaints that the accused have too many 
rights, there is room for considerable caution and concern. Thus far, the 
Supreme Court has avoided recognizing general Charter rights for 
victims. This is as it should be. A criminal trial is about determining guilt 
and the just punishment of accused, not about personal redress for 
victims. What, for example, if the input of victims were to be determina-
tive on the issue of sentence? It surely would be unjust to have the length 
of a prison sentence determined by whether the victim wants revenge or 
compassion. It seems clear that a general right of representation of 
victims at trial, even on the determination of guilt, would hopelessly 
burden and confuse an already overtaxed and under-resourced criminal 
justice system. 
Thus far, the enforceable Charter rights for victims are those of pri-
vacy and equality for complainants, but only in sexual assault cases. The 
recognition of enforceable section 15 equality rights came by mere 
assertion in the context of access to medical records in R. v. Mills,78 
without any consideration of the 10-part test the Court had earlier 
established in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigra-
tion)79 to assess section 15 claims. In R. v. Shearing,80 however, a 7-2 
                                                                                                             
77 Justice Doherty of the Ontario Court of Appeal has pointed to the dangers of labels such 
as good or bad faith in R. v. Kitaitchik, [2002] O.J. No. 2476, 4 C.R. (6th) 38, at para. 41 (Ont. C.A.), 
relying on C. Hill, “The Role of Fault in Section 24(2) of the Charter” in J. Cameron, ed., The 
Charter’s Impact on the Criminal Justice System (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), at 57. 
78 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, 28 C.R. (5th) 207 (S.C.C.). 
79 [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.). 
80 [2002] S.C.J. No. 59, 2 C.R. (6th) 213 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Shearing”]. 
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majority of the Supreme Court ruled that defence counsel ought to have 
been allowed to cross-examine a complainant in a sexual assault trial as 
to a lack of reference to abuse in her diary, of which the accused had 
gained possession. According to Binnie J. for the majority, the view of 
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the court below that the balance 
had shifted from the rights of accused to the equality rights of complain-
ants was wrong, “even in terms of production of third party records”.81 In 
Shearing there is no mention in the majority judgment of the unruly and 
unworkable principle that there is no hierarchy of rights, and the lan-
guage of privacy and equality rights for complainants seems to be 
deliberately softened to that of “interests” and “values”. The general 
approach in Shearing82 is a welcome recalibration of the balance of the 
rights of the accused and those of complainants in favour of the right to a 
fair trial. The Court ought to return to serious analysis of this section 15 
issue in the sexual assault context, now that it has in R. v. Kapp83 unani-
mously backed off the 15-part Law test in favour of a simpler test of 
whether the distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds 
creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping. 
The implications of an enforceable section 15 right for complainants 
in sexual assault cases has been left unexplored. The policy issues are far 
wider than establishing rights for protection of therapeutic and other 
records of complainants. Can complainants now seek status to be 
represented throughout a sexual assault trial? Why is representation 
allowed in the case of access to records but not rape shield hearings? 
What of such rights for principal witnesses in other gendered crimes such 
as domestic assault? 
In the context of criminal law the enshrinement of section 15 equal-
ity rights has had a far greater and welcome impact when there is no 
attempt to claim an enforceable right, but a reliance instead on “equality-
lite” arguments of the need to be respectful of equality values. This has, 
for example, allowed the Supreme Court in R. v. Tran,84 respecting the 
partial defence to murder, to rule obiter that the individualized approach 
to the ordinary person test must be respectful of Charter values against 
discrimination so that homophobia and honour killings cannot ground 
provocation defences. 
                                                                                                             
81 Id., at para. 132 (emphasis in original). 
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and stereotypes in the now abrogated doctrine of recent complaint. 
83 [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.). 
84 [2011] S.C.J. No. 58, 80 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). 
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The balance needs to be addressed in the context of our rape shield 
laws. Unlike any country in the Western world, Canada’s rape shield 
protection applies, ever since a further assertion by McLachlin J. in R. v. 
Seaboyer85 and now according to the Criminal Code, equally to prior 
sexual history with the accused. The Supreme Court in R. v. Darrach86 
upheld the statutory regime as constitutional, but it left ambiguities such 
that the law is not clear. The Court found that the rules in section 276(1) 
are not blanket exclusions and may lead to admission under the criteria 
of section 276(2). Can that lead to admission on the issue of consent? 
Consent is often the central issue in sexual assault trials, especially since 
the Supreme Court in R. v. Ewanchuk87 so drastically narrowed the 
defence of mistaken belief in consent. The problem is that Darrach is 
self-contradictory, indicating at one point that such evidence would never 
be admissible on the issue of consent as it is not relevant and, at another, 
that such evidence is rarely admissible to show consent. 
There is a consistent line of authority, especially in the Ontario Supe-
rior Court (reviewed in R. v. Strickland 88 and see earlier R. v. Temert-
zoglou89), to admit prior evidence of sexual conduct with the accused to 
show “context”. Admitting that evidence is “part of the context” seems 
very like the “part of the narrative” ruse often resorted to, to bypass 
unwelcome evidentiary rules.90 The real problem is that the twin myth 
hypotheses are too rigid. David Paciocco91 suggested judges read them 
down to forbid only general stereotypical inferences and to allow 
inferences specific to the case. This was the approach taken by Fuerst J. 
in Temertzoglou. This solution is rather like that adopted by the Supreme 
Court in R. v. Handy92 for similar fact evidence: pattern evidence of the 
accused can exceptionally be admitted as evidence of specific rather than 
general propensity. The Paciocco analysis found favour in lower courts 
but was not squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in Darrach. 
In R. v. A. (No. 2),93 the House of Lords somehow read Darrach as 
not applying rape shield principles equally to prior sexual history with 
                                                                                                             
85 [1991] S.C.J. No. 62, 7 C.R. (4th) 117 (S.C.C.). 
86 [2000] S.C.J. No. 46, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Darrach”]. 
87 [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330 (S.C.C.). 
88 [2007] O.J. No. 517, 45 C.R. (6th) 183 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
89 [2002] O.J. No. 4951, 11 C.R. (6th) 179 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
90 See Christopher Nowlin, “A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing” (2006) 51 Crim. L.Q. 238, 271. 
91 D. Paciocco, “The New Rape Shield Provisions in Section 276 Should Survive Charter 
Challenge” (1993) 21 C.R. (4th) 223. 
92 [2002] S.C.J. No. 57, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 908 (S.C.C.). 
93 [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1546 (H.L.). 
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the accused. The Law Lords unanimously declared that new United 
Kingdom rape shield laws offended fair trial rights in the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms94 in applying with equal force to prior sexual history with the 
accused. 
Following the Kobe Bryant rape trial acquittal in the United States, 
Dean Michelle Anderson has called for restrictions on evidence of prior 
sexual history with the accused in U.S. jurisdictions.95 But she accepts it 
as a given that: 
prior negotiations between the complainant and the defendant regarding 
the specific acts at issue or customs and practices about those acts 
should be admissible. Those negotiations, customs, and practices 
between the parties reveal their legitimate expectations on the incident 
in question.96 
My sympathy is with trial judges attempting to ensure in appropriate 
cases that sexual assault trials are fair to both the accused and the 
accuser. 
3. Charter Rights for Accused Should Not Depend on Their Being 
Asserted 
One of the key Charter rights is the right to counsel under arrest or 
detention under section 10(b). One of the early compromises the Su-
preme Court made was to decide that,97 while the informational right to 
be advised of the right to counsel is automatic, implementation duties, 
such as the requirement for police to stop questioning before a reason-
able opportunity to consult counsel has been provided, only arise where 
the right to counsel is asserted. The right may also be lost if the detainee 
does not continue to assert it with reasonable diligence. This means that 
assertive and criminal law savvy suspects get a full panoply of rights 
while the most vulnerable — those who are ignorant of their rights, naïve 
or just plain scared — get nothing. The Stinchcombe right to full disclo-
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96 Id., at 19. 
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sure98 is also triggered by a request. How this works out for an unrepre-
sented accused is uncertain. 
4. The Court Needs to Reconsider Its Decidedly Pro-State Balance 
in Its Much-Criticized Interrogation Trilogy of Oickle,99 Singh100 
and Sinclair101 
The vehemence of the protests of the dissenters in Singh and Sinclair 
is palpable and, in my view, justified. In Sinclair, Binnie J. fires the most 
direct salvo: 
What now appears to be licenced as a result of the ‘interrogation 
trilogy’ [Oickle, Singh and now Sinclair] is that an individual 
(presumed innocent) may be detained and isolated for questioning by 
the police for at least five or six hours without reasonable recourse to a 
lawyer, during which time the officers can brush aside assertions of the 
right to silence or demands to be returned to his or her cell, in an 
endurance contest in which the police interrogators, taking turns with 
one another, hold all the important legal cards.102 
[W]hen the decisions are read together the resulting latitude allowed to 
the police to deal with a detainee, who is to be presumed innocent, 
disproportionately favours the interests of the state in the investigation 
of crime over the rights of the individual in a free society ...103 
According to LeBel and Fish JJ. (with Abella J. concurring), the sugges-
tion of the majority 
[t]hat our residual concerns can be meaningfully addressed by way of 
the confessions rule thus ignores what we have learned about the 
dynamics of custodial interrogations and renders pathetically anaemic 
the entrenched constitutional rights to counsel and to silence.104 
When the pre-trial right to silence was first recognized by McLachlin 
J. in R. v. Hebert105 under section 7, the Court used strong language. 
There was a need in the Charter era to move beyond the old common 
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law’s focus on reliability to allow judicial control of police interrogation, 
abuses and tricks. The detainee had a fundamental right to choose 
whether to speak to police. The Court held that the police trick of 
sending an undercover officer into a cell to overcome the assertion of the 
right to silence violated section 7 and should result in exclusion. There 
was no consideration of involuntariness. The Court was pragmatic in 
limiting the right in that context to arise only on detention and to pre-
clude only active eliciting “functionally equivalent to interrogation” as 
later characterized in R. v. Broyles.106 The majority in Hebert refused to 
require that the detainee be advised of the right to silence. In the context 
of undercover officers, this decision seems wise; otherwise, all types of 
undercover work would have been effectively outlawed. 
It has long been accepted that advising the accused of a right to re-
main silent is not a requirement of the voluntary confession rule, but a 
lack of warning may be taken into account in determining voluntariness 
(R. v. Boudreau107). At common law, the right to silence operates, held 
Abella J. for a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v. Turcotte,108 to allow no 
adverse inferences to be drawn from pre-trial silence lest it be a “snare 
and delusion” to advise the accused of the right to remain silent and then 
to use it against someone who exercises it. 
Although there is still strong rhetoric in the majority opinion in Sin-
clair about the apparently fundamental section 7 right to choose not to 
speak to known police interrogators, there is no Charter requirement that 
the accused be advised of that right and no remedy contemplated 
irrespective of voluntariness if that right is breached. As pointed out by 
the dissenters in Sinclair, a major disappointment is that, as in Singh, the 
detainee repeatedly asserting the right to silence and/or right to consult 
counsel will not in itself lead to a Charter remedy under section 7 or 
section 10(b). That is apparently not a “snare and delusion”. A right 
without a remedy is meaningless. The Hebert section 7 right to silence 
against proactive questioning by undercover agents in cells is therefore 
now the anomaly. 
For controls on normal police interrogation in custody, the majority 
places its trust on what the majority in Sinclair call the “broad” voluntary 
confession rule set out in Oickle. The problem is that the Supreme Court 
confirmation of rulings on voluntariness on the facts of Oickle and Singh 
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gives no comfort for those seeking such judicial control on aggressive 
interrogation determined to get the detainee to confess at all costs. Bright 
and committed detectives have been given a huge authority to use tricks, 
inducements, lies, polygraphs and psychological techniques largely free 
of scrutiny by lawyers and even in the face of multiple assertions of the 
so-called right to silence. 
The newly reconstituted Supreme Court should reconsider especially 
their rulings that one brief consultation with duty counsel satisfies 
section 10(b),109 in order to give better meaning to the right to silence. 
However, the trilogy is of course binding, and even narrow majorities 
often are hard to get reconsidered or changed.110 The hope for a better 
balance may well lie with trial judges presiding over voluntary confes-
sion voir dires. Under Oickle, it should be recalled, and this was not 
emphasized in Sinclair, a confession must be excluded if oppressive 
conditions resulted in involuntariness or, irrespective of involuntariness, 
if the police tricks were “shocking”. The latter is a high hurdle, but it 
does give judges a direct remedy of exclusion for egregious interroga-
tions. Prior to Oickle, Ketchum J. in R. v. S. (M.J.)111 excluded a confes-
sion in part because the videotape revealed Calgary police were using the 
oppressive atmosphere and psychological brainwashing Reid method 
pioneered in the United States, which should not, he held, be accepted in 
Canada. That method is currently in widespread use and emphasized in 
police training. It should result in judicial controls in egregious cases. 
Some judges112 have recently linked their decision to exclude a confes-
sion to a consideration of an inadequate discharge of the section 10(a) 
obligation to advise of the reason for arrest or detention. Some judges 
might wish to resort to the little-known automatic exclusion rule for 
evidence obtained by mental or physical torture to be found in section 
269.1(4) of the Criminal Code. 
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5. The Protection against Cruel and Unusual Punishment under 
Section 12 Needs to Be Revitalized and Used to Strike Down 
Disproportionate Minimum Penalties 
In R. v. Ferguson,113 McLachlin C.J.C., on behalf of a unanimous 
Supreme Court, decided that constitutional exemptions were not avail-
able as a remedy for mandatory minimum sentence. Paul Calarco114 sees 
a silver lining for defence counsel. He suggests that without judges being 
able to fall back on the solution of a constitutional exemption to a 
mandatory minimum sentence in the individual case, it will be easier to 
have the penalty struck down as grossly disproportionate. Hopefully115 
this will breathe new life into section 12 challenges. 
The judicial record since the Supreme Court in R. v. Smith116 struck 
down the seven-year minimum sentence for importing a narcotic has 
indeed thus far been one of retreat and timidity.117 There will be clear 
challenges to the courts to dust off section 12 to put constitutional brakes 
on Parliament’s new appetite for enacting minimum punishments at a 
time when the United States courts and policy-makers have become 
acutely aware of the danger, injustice and costs of such sentencing 
rigidity. A strong candidate is the simplistic and ridiculous grid scheme 
for sentencing for possession of marijuana for trafficking: mandatory 6 
months for 6-200 plants, 1 year for 201-500 plants and 2 years for 501 or 
more plants found at the time of the police raid. In R. v. Smickle,118 
Molloy J. of the Ontario Superior Court recently used section 12 to strike 
down a three-year minimum sentence where police entered a home 
looking for another person and found the accused taking a picture of 
himself holding a loaded handgun. That intrepid decision is under appeal. 
The cat would be among the pigeons — or in this case among the 
hawks — were our Court to follow the recent U.S. Supreme Court 
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remedy119 of ordering the release of 3,700 prisoners to deal with over-
crowding in California. 
The Harper Government has consistently said it will not reintroduce 
the death penalty. Yet, a recent poll120 finds that 49 per cent of Canadians 
support the death penalty “for dangerous offenders”. In its impressive 
judgment in United States of America v. Burns,121 the Court was unani-
mous in deciding that the Minister of Justice should not have agreed to 
the extradition of Canadian citizens on aggravated first degree murder 
charges in the state of Washington without obtaining assurances that the 
death penalty would not be imposed. The issue was decided under 
section 7. However, the Court added the following comment: 
We are not called upon in this appeal to determine whether capital 
punishment would, if authorized by the Canadian Parliament, violate 
s. 12 of the Charter (“cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”), and 
if so in what circumstances. It is, however, incontestable that capital 
punishment, whether or not it violates s. 12 of the Charter, and whether 
or not it could be upheld under s. 1, engages the underlying values of 
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It is final. It is 
irreversible. Its imposition has been described as arbitrary. Its deterrent 
value has been doubted. Its implementation necessarily causes 
psychological and physical suffering.122 
It is salutary and another sign of the power of the Charter that the 
Supreme Court is on record that it would likely find that the death 
penalty would violate section 12. 
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